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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
IT’S TIME TO CUT BACK THE GREASE AND 
ADD SOME GUIDANCE 
Rebecca Koch*
Abstract: Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to combat 
an epidemic of illicit payments by U.S. businesses and individuals to 
foreign ofªcials. The FCPA prohibits any bribe to a foreign ofªcial to 
inºuence any ofªcial act, induce unlawful action, or obtain or retain 
business. The FCPA, however, carves out an exception for facilitating 
grease payments made to foreign ofªcials to expedite or secure per-
formance of routine government actions. This exception allows for 
modest payments to low-ranking ofªcials to expedite non-discretionary 
clerical activities. The FCPA fails to provide a monetary threshold for 
what constitutes a permissible grease payment. This Note explains that 
the carve-out for grease payments impedes the Congressional goal of 
stamping out corruption. To alleviate the problems associated with grease 
payments, this Note advocates for Congressional repeal, or amendment 
of, the statute; DOJ promulgation of guidelines deªning permissible 
grease payments; corporate activism; and institutional reform. 
I. Introduction 
 Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 
an unprecedented attempt to combat the epidemic of illicit payments 
by U.S. businesses and individuals to foreign government ofªcials.1 
Despite the FCPA’s enactment, transnational corruption remains a 
potent and debilitating force affecting U.S. foreign policy, the United 
States’ international economic interests, and the political and eco-
nomic interests of developing nations.2 This pervasive trend erodes 
public conªdence in the business community and tarnishes the image 
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1 See Gary Eisenberg, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 595, 595–96 
(2000). 
2 Donald B. Cruver, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1 (2nd 
ed. 1999) (describing the national and international effects of corruption); Walter Perkel, 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 683, 686 (2003) (suggesting that the FCPA 
has not signiªcantly reduced corruption). 
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of the U.S. government abroad. Against this erosion, the FCPA falls 
short.3 The current provisions of the FCPA are weak and ineffectual; 
speciªcally, the exception for “grease” or “facilitating” payments made 
to foreign ofªcials to expedite or secure the performance of routine 
government actions.4 These grease payments currently comprise a 
gray area of corruption, blurring the distinction between legal and 
illegal payments to government ofªcials and opening the ºood gates 
for abuse.5 Although the FCPA does not prohibit grease payments, 
such payments may still be considered bribes, carrying with them 
many potential deleterious effects.6 Unlike the United States, the in-
ternational community is progressing toward criminalization of all 
payments to foreign ofªcials.7
 As the basis underlying Congress’ decision to allow grease pay-
ments continues to dissolve, Congress and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) could rein in the ill effects of grease payments.8 First, congres-
sional repeal of the statutory exception would provide a quick solu-
tion to the troubles associated with grease payments. Another poten-
tial avenue for redress is for Congress to amend the statute to provide 
for a monetary threshold, above which a payment will not constitute a 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure, Hearing on S. 
305 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 1 (1977) (opening 
statement of William Proxmire, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Af-
fairs). 
4 See Cruver, supra note 2, at 20 (indicating that grease payments are not prohibited 
by the FCPA); Perkel, supra note 2, at 686 (stating that corruption is still pervasive despite 
the FCPA provisions). 
5 See Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the “Tipping Point”: The Role 
of Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 471, 
476–77 (2001). 
6 See id. at 477. 
7 See Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business—The 
Dawn of a New Era, 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 349, 350 (2000). 
8 See generally The Foreign Trade Practices Act, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Intn’l Econ. 
Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong. 217 (1983) (prepared 
statement of Mark Feldman, Attorney, Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine) (stating that it 
was customary practice to give grease payments to underpaid, low-ranking civil servants) 
[hereinafter Foreign Trade Hearings]; H.R. Rep. No. 95–640, at 8 (1977) (stating that it 
would not be feasible for the United States to attempt to eradicate grease payments unilat-
erally); M. McCary, Bridging Ethical Borders: International Legal Ethics with an Islamic Perspec-
tive, 35 Tex. Int’l L.J. 289, 314 (stating that an international consensus has emerged that 
grease payments constitute bribery); Wallace-Bruce, supra note 7, at 350, 357–59 (explain-
ing that an international effort is evolving to minimize, if not eliminate, corruption and 
that the positive effects of corruption, such as supplementing the incomes of underpaid, 
low-level government ofªcials, are outweighed by the negative effects). 
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permissible grease payment.9 Congress could also establish a two-
prong test for permissible grease payments, requiring: (1) the payer 
to make the payment for the purpose of securing or expediting a rou-
tine government action; and (2) that the payment fall beneath a cer-
tain percentage of the country’s per capita income.10 Finally, to fur-
ther prevent abuse of the FCPA and enlighten businesses about grease 
payments, the DOJ should promulgate guidelines to elucidate what 
constitutes a permissible grease payment.11
 Section II of this Note provides a brief history of the FCPA and a 
summary of the anti-bribery provisions. This section also addresses 
the international response to transnational corruption that ensued 
from the enactment of the FCPA. Section III sets forth the arguments 
against the FCPA and the ºaws inherent in the grease payments ex-
ception. Section IV addresses various methods to alleviate the troubles 
associated with grease payments, including the possible repeal of the 
grease payment exception and the inclusion of a dollar limit for 
grease payments into the FCPA. This section also advocates for the 
DOJ to create guidelines to clarify what constitutes a grease payment. 
In consideration of the inherent limitations of legislative solutions in 
this arena, this section also addresses extra-legal solutions to the prob-
lem of transnational corruption. 
II. Background and History 
A. Enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the United States 
 Business reliance upon bribery as a method of obtaining favorable, 
foreign business contracts has evolved into an international business 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simpliªcation Act: Joint Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Sec. and the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 438 (1977) (prepared statement of Wallace L. 
Timmeny, Kutak, Rock & Huie) (suggesting that a better approach to grease payments 
would be to establish a dollar limit) [hereinafter Business Accounting Hearings]. 
10 See Foreign Trade Hearings, supra note 8, at 285 (testimony of Steven J. Brogan, Associ-
ate, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue) (suggesting that the legality of the payment should turn 
on its purpose); Unlawful Corporate Payment Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Con-
sumer Protection and Fin. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 44 
(1977) (comment of Rep. Krueger, Member, Hous. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce) (suggesting that the allowance for grease payments could vary with per capita 
income) [hereinafter Unlawful Corporate Payment Hearings]. 
11 See generally Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is to Be Done with the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 431, 462 (1987) (suggesting that the 
DOJ acknowledged its role in providing guidance to the application of the FCPA’s provi-
sions by issuing guidelines). 
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custom.12 Illegal or improper payments by U.S. businesses to foreign 
ofªcials are certainly not a recent development.13 Prior to 1977, most 
nations failed to criminalize the extraterritorial payment of bribes by 
domestic companies.14 In the United States, the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) brought its ªrst action against a corporation for 
multinational bribery in SEC v. United Brands.15 In United Brands, the 
corporation funneled $2.5 million in bribes to the President of Hondu-
ras in exchange for a reduced local tax on an exported product.16 Fu-
eled by the United Brands’ scandal and allegations that corporate giants 
(particularly Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, and Lockheed) made payments to 
presidents, prime ministers, and royalty of major trading partners, the 
SEC created a voluntary disclosure program.17 The SEC’s program re-
sulted in a published report that revealed over 400 U.S. businesses had 
made questionable payments to foreign ofªcials.18 Lockheed alone 
admitted to spending more than $22 million in bribes to foreign 
ofªcials.19 In 1977, after months of discussions with the SEC, Congress 
unanimously enacted the FCPA as part of the 1943 Securities Exchange 
Act.20 “The Senate Committee in which the legislation originated de-
scribed the Act as a ‘strong antibribery law’ and recommended its en-
actment to ‘bring corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public 
conªdence in the integrity of the American business system.’”21
 The FCPA criminalized bribery of foreign ofªcials by U.S. busi-
nesses and individuals conducting business abroad.22 U.S. businesses 
consequently suffered a competitive disadvantage to foreign busi-
                                                                                                                      
12 Robert S. Levy, Note, The Antibribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977: Are They Really as Valuable as We Think They Are?, 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 71, 72 (1985). 
13 See David L. Heifetz, Japan’s Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Weaker 
and Less Effective than the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 Pac. Rim L. & pol’y J. 209, 209 
(2002). 
14 See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 229, 230–31 (1997). 
15 Levy, supra note 12, at 74. 
16 Id. 
17 See Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t? The 
OECD Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 
1249, 1255–56 (1999). 
18 Id.; Christopher J. Duncan, Comments, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amend-
ments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism, 1 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 16, 10 (2000). 
19 Heifetz, supra note 13, at 209. 
20 Duncan, supra note 18, at 11 (explaining that Congress unanimously enacted the 
FCPA); Perkel, supra note 2, at 683 (indicating that Congress enacted the FCPA as part of 
the 1943 Securities Exchange Act). 
21 Levy, supra note 12, at 71 (quoting S. Rep. No. 95–114, at 4101 (1977)). 
22 Perkel, supra note 2, at 683. 
2005] Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 383 
nesses that were uninhibited by laws proscribing bribery in interna-
tional markets.23 As a result of corporate protest, the FCPA was 
amended in 1988, and again in 1998.24 In 1988, to promote a level 
playing-ªeld and clarify ambiguities in the 1977 FCPA, Congress 
amended the FCPA under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act, adding two afªrmative defenses and instructing the executive 
branch to urge the United States’ trading partners to pass anti-
corruption laws.25 In 1998, Congress amended the FCPA to imple-
ment the provisions of the Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Ofªcials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention).26 The 1998 amendments expanded the breadth of po-
tential FCPA violations by including some foreign nationals within the 
scope of persons covered by the act.27
B. The Anti-bribery Provisions 
 The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, located in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 
to 78dd-3, prohibit any bribe to a foreign ofªcial to “inºuence any 
ofªcial act, induce any unlawful action, induce any action that would 
assist in obtaining or retaining business, or secure any improper ad-
vantage.”28 These provisions prohibit individuals or businesses from 
offering, paying, promising, or authorizing to pay, either directly or 
indirectly, money or anything of value to any foreign ofªcial.29 The 
FCPA provides no distinction between grand and petty bribery.30 
However, relatively large scale bribes (tens of thousands to millions of 
dollars) comprise the majority of prosecutions.31
 The 1998 amendments to the FCPA eliminated the territorial 
nexus requirement between the illicit act and the United States.32 Con-
sequently, the provisions apply to “any person” who commits bribery on 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. at 683–84. 
24 Id. at 684. 
25 See Salbu, supra note 14, at 243 (indicating that Congress amended the FCPA in 
1988 under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act); Perkel, supra note 2, at 684 
(explaining that Congress amended the FCPA to promote a level playing ªeld and clarify 
ambiguities in the 1977 FCPA). 
26 Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 596. 
27 Perkel, supra note 2, at 685. 
28 Id. at 691 (quoting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 
to dd-3 (2000)) 
29 Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 601. 
30 Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational 
Bribery, 33 Cornell Int’l L.J. 657, 682 (2000). 
31 Id. 
32 Perkel, supra note 2, at 695. 
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U.S. territory regardless of whether the accused is a resident or con-
ducts business in the United States.33 Moreover, individual corporate 
employees can be prosecuted under the FCPA even if their employer-
corporation is not found guilty of an FCPA violation.34 The FCPA also 
prohibits payments to third parties, “while knowing” that the third 
party will use any or all of the payment as a bribe, or for any purpose 
inconsistent with the FCPA.35 Neither foreign ofªcials who receive 
bribes from U.S. companies, nor foreign ofªcials who conspire to vio-
late the FCPA, can be prosecuted under the FCPA for such a viola-
tion.36
 Additionally, the 1988 amendments provided U.S. businesses and 
individuals charged with violating the anti-bribery provisions with two 
afªrmative defenses, thereby eliminating liability for payments that 
are legal in the recipient country or that are considered “reasonable 
and bona ªde expenditures.”37 The ªrst afªrmative defense allows 
“payment, gift, offer or promise of anything of value” to a foreign 
ofªcial or political party if the country’s written laws permit such an 
offering.38 To successfully use this defense, the DOJ recommends that 
a U.S. business seek legal advice from both local counsel and through 
the DOJ review procedure process.39 The second afªrmative defense 
addresses payments, gifts, offers, or promises of anything of value that 
constitute a “reasonable and bona ªde expenditure.”40 A defendant 
may only assert this defense if he or she can show that the bona ªde 
expenditures lack a corrupt purpose.41 Moreover, the expenditure 
must be “directly related” either to the promotion, demonstration, or 
explanation of products and services, or to the execution or perform-
ance of a contract with a foreign government or agency.42
 Convicted violators of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions can face 
severe punishment under the act.43 A corporation or an individual 
                                                                                                                      
33 See id. at 692. 
34 Id. at 692–93. 
35 Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 604. 
36 Perkel, supra note, 2, at 693 
37 Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 605-06. 
38 Perkel, supra note 2, at 697 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1) (2000)). 
39 Id. 
40 Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 605–06 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2) (2000)). 
41 Perkel, supra note 2, at 698. 
42 Id. at 698 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2) (2000)). 
43 See Corr & Lawler, supra note 17, at 1263. A violation of the anti-bribery provisions of 
the FCPA requires proof of the following: 
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acting on his own behalf may face ªnes up to $2 million per viola-
tion.44 The FCPA provides that an individual acting for a corporation 
can receive ªnes up to $100,000 and imprisonment for a maximum of 
ªve years for each violation.45 In addition to criminal punishment, the 
FCPA provides for civil penalties of up to $10,000 for violations of the 
anti-bribery provisions by either a corporation or an individual.46
 Contrary to its objective of stamping out multinational bribery, 
the FCPA does not prohibit all payments to foreign ofªcials.47 An ex-
ception to the FCPA permits payments to public ofªcials for “routine 
governmental actions.”48 Congress added the “routine government 
action” language to the FCPA in the 1988 amendments to clarify the 
provision in the original version that permitted payments to foreign 
ofªcials who performed “ministerial” or “clerical” duties.49 This statu-
tory exception permits U.S. businesses to make “modest” payments to 
low-ranking ofªcials to speed up or secure the performance of clerical 
activities that do not involve the exercise of discretion.50 The FCPA’s 
exception for grease payments does not extend to payments to for-
                                                                                                                      
(i) a U.S. “issuer, “domestic concern,” or “any person,” including the ofªcers, 
directors, employees, agents or shareholders acting on behalf of the issuer, 
domestic concern, or person (ii) makes use of the mails, or any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce (iii) in furtherance of an offer, pay-
ment, promise to pay, or authorization to pay anything of value (iv) to any 
foreign ofªcial, any foreign political party or ofªcial thereof, or any candidate 
for foreign political ofªce, or other person knowing, that the payment to that 
other person would be passed on to a foreign ofªcial, foreign political party 
or ofªcial thereof, or candidate for foreign political ofªce (v) inside the terri-
tory of the United States or, for any United States personality, outside the 
United States (vi) to corruptly (vii) inºuence any ofªcial act or decision, or 
induce an action or an omission to act in violation of a lawful duty, or to se-
cure any improper advantage (viii) or induce any act or decision that would 
assist the company in obtaining, retaining, or directing business to any per-
son. 
Perkel, supra note 2, at 693–95 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2000)). 
44 Corr & Lawler, supra note 17, at 1263. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1264. 
47 See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 604. 
48 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b)(1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(1994)) 
49 Cruver, supra note 2, at 20 (stating that the 1988 amendments changed the focus of 
grease payments from the status of the recipient to the purpose or nature of the payment); 
see Steven R. Salbu, Transnational Bribery: The Big Questions, 21 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 435, 
449–50 (2001) (stating that Congress amended the FCPA to allow grease payments for 
routine government acts, instead of allowing such payments to foreign ofªcials with minis-
terial or clerical functions). 
50 Don Zarin, Doing Business Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 5-1 to -3 
(1995). 
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eign ofªcials that are used to encourage those ofªcials to generate 
new business or continue business with a particular party.51 Routine 
government actions consist of non-discretionary acts that a foreign 
ofªcial ordinarily performs during daily business.52 The FCPA de-
scribes such routine acts as: obtaining permits, licenses, or documents 
that are needed to do business in a foreign country; processing gov-
ernmental papers, such as visas and work orders; scheduling inspec-
tions; providing police protection; picking-up or delivering mail; pro-
viding phone, power, and water service; and loading, unloading, or 
protecting perishable products or commodities.53 The FCPA provides 
no dollar limit on the amount of permissible grease payments.54 No 
court has yet to interpret this exception to the FCPA.55
C. International Developments 
 In the time since 1977, nations have begun to view bribery and 
corrupt practices as a “scourge” and “impediment” to international 
business, economic and political development, and stability.56 The in-
creased recognition of corruption and its negative effects is evidenced 
by the proliferation of numerous international initiatives against brib-
ery and corruption.57 For example, Transparency International, the 
European Union, the Council of Europe, the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank 
all have instituted anti-corruption measures and programs.58
 The most signiªcant recent development in international cor-
ruption law is the OECD Convention, adopted in November 1997 by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.59 The 
stimulus for the OECD Convention stemmed from the 1988 amend-
ments to the FCPA that directed the executive branch to pursue in-
                                                                                                                      
51 Perkel, supra note 2, at 696. 
52 Id. at 696–97. 
53 Id. at 697. 
54 Cruver, supra note 2, at 20. 
55 Perkel, supra note 2, at 697; Salbu, supra note 49, at 451. 
56 Bonnie H. Weinstein, International Legal Developments in Review: 2001 Business Regula-
tion, 36 Int’l law. 355, 355 (2002). 
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 357. 
59 John W. Brooks, Fighting International Corruption, 20 No. 6 GPSolo 42, 42 (2003) 
(calling the adoption of the OECD Convention the most signiªcant development in inter-
national law); Heifetz, supra note 13, at 210 (indicating that the adoption of the OECD 
Convention occurred in November 1997). 
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ternational anti-bribery measures within the OECD.60 In 1989, the 
U.S. representatives to the OECD put forth efforts to initiate a multi-
lateral agreement against bribery.61 As a result of international pres-
sures, the majority of the OECD member states agreed to comply with 
the non-binding package of recommendations contained in the 
OECD Recommendations on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions.62 In May 1997, the OECD Committee reconvened to 
evaluate the measures implemented by member countries pursuant to 
the recommendations.63 Throughout the course of this meeting, the 
U.S. delegation strongly encouraged other members to adopt a bind-
ing anti-bribery agreement that ultimately led to the adoption of the 
OECD Convention.64
 The Preamble to the OECD Convention provides that “bribery is 
a widespread phenomenon in international business transactions, in-
cluding trade and investment, which raises serious moral and political 
concerns, undermines good governance and economic development, 
and distorts international competitive conditions.”65 Signatories of 
the OECD Convention assumed obligations to implement its provi-
sions through the passage of domestic legislation by December 31, 
1999.66 The ensuing enactment of domestic anti-bribery laws demon-
strated some level of international support for the idea that bribery of 
foreign public ofªcials is unacceptable.67
 The OECD Convention requires its parties to promulgate laws 
that criminalize the bribery of foreign ofªcials.68 The Convention 
deªnes the act of bribery as: 
[T]o offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other 
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a 
foreign public ofªcial, for that ofªcial or for a third party, in 
order that the ofªcial act or refrain from acting in relation 
to the performance of ofªcial duties, in order to obtain or 
                                                                                                                      
60 Heifetz, supra note 13, at 213. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See Id. 
65 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofªcials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105–43, pmbl. [hereinafter 
OECD Convention]. 
66 Heifetz, supra note 13, at 210. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 214. 
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retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct 
of international business.69
It deªnes foreign public ofªcial as “any person holding a legislative, 
administrative or judicial ofªce of a foreign country, whether ap-
pointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a for-
eign country, including for a public agency or public enterprises; and 
any ofªcial or agent of a public international organization.”70 The 
Convention further requires that parties criminalize complicity with, 
the attempt to, as well as the conspiracy to, commit such bribery.71 
Many scholars have criticized the OECD Convention for its failure to 
prohibit bribery of political parties and candidates, as well as the tax 
deductibility of illicit payments.72
 The United Nations directed its attention to the issue of bribery in 
1996, as evidenced by the General Assembly’s adoption of two declara-
tions: The Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International 
Commercial Transactions and The Declaration of the International 
Code of Conduct for Public Ofªcials.73 The ªrst declaration attempted 
to criminalize foreign bribery and abolish tax deductibility for bribery 
of foreign ofªcials as a legitimate business expense.74 In 1998, the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted the second declaration, urging the criminaliza-
tion of the bribery of foreign ofªcials and the development of pro-
grams to combat bribery and corruption.75 In December 2000, a 
number of United Nations member states signed the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, calling for the 
criminalization of both national and international corruption.76
 In 1996, the Organization of American States adopted the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption (“Inter-American Conven-
tion”), seeking to eradicate bribery and corruption in member coun-
tries.77 Although bearing similarities to the FCPA and OECD Conven-
tion, the Inter-American Convention goes even further to combat 
bribery and corruption.78 For instance, it addresses the demand side of 
                                                                                                                      
69 OECD Convention, supra note 65, art. 1 § 1. 
70 Id. art. 1 § 4(a). 
71 See id. art 1 § 2. 
72 Perkel, supra note 2, at 704. 
73 Weinstein, supra note 56, at 355. 
74 Id. at 355–56. 
75 Id. at 356. 
76 Brooks, supra note 59, at 43. 
77 Id. at 42. 
78 Id. 
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bribery by prohibiting the solicitation of improper payments by gov-
ernment ofªcials.79 To comply with the Inter-American Convention’s 
requirements, signatories must criminalize both demand and supply 
side corruption, the bribe-seeking acts or omissions by governmental 
ofªcials, as well as the payments themselves.80 Unless particular circum-
stances warrant application of an exception, the Inter-American Con-
vention further requires that each member state proscribe “illicit en-
richment,” deªned as an “unexplainable signiªcant increase in 
wealth.”81 Regrettably, the Inter-American Convention lacks a valid en-
forcement mechanism.82
III. Discussion 
A. Problems with the Grease Payment Exception 
1. The Statutory Language is Ambiguous 
 Numerous ailments currently plague the FCPA’s exception for 
grease payments, thereby impeding its goal of eliminating illegal pay-
ments to foreign ofªcials.83 A close examination of the statutory text 
reveals problems with its construction, that, in turn, hinder enforce-
ment of the FCPA and provide insufªcient guidance to U.S. busi-
nesses.84 One source of trouble with the grease payment exception 
arises from the indeterminacy of the statutory language.85 Speciªcally, 
enforcement difªculties with the provision arise from the possible mul-
tiple interpretations of “routine.”86 A U.S. business can interpret “rou-
tine” in several different ways: a business could interpret it to simply 
mean “frequently,” or the business could interpret it to mean “ordi-
nary” or “commonplace.”87 Whether a payment to a foreign ofªcial is 
permissible under the exception may depend on the particular inter-
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Brooks, supra note 59, at 42–43. 
82 Id. at 43. 
83 See generally, e.g., Salbu, supra note 14, at 266 (stating three problems with the FCPA’s 
provision for grease payments). 
84 See id. (explaining that the FCPA forces businesses to analogize to the statute when 
situations arise that are not specially enumerated in the statute, which is something busi-
nesses are ill-equipped to perform). 
85 Id. 
86 See Salbu, supra note 49, at 451–52. 
87 Id. at 451. 
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pretation of “routine” taken.88 Moreover, a foreign ofªcial demanding 
a payment to speed up a decision honestly may be seeking payment for 
quick service, or may be using euphemistic language to cloak what is 
really a bribe for preferential treatment in contract procurement.89 
The various interpretations of the meaning of “routine” thus can leave 
a business in the lurch as to how to lawfully proceed.90
 The FCPA’s deªnition for “routine” government action sets forth 
some examples of permissible grease payments to government 
ofªcials and indicates that it will also permit “actions of a similar na-
ture.”91 The statute, however, provides sparse guidance when ques-
tionable situations arise that are not speciªcally enumerated in the 
statute, leaving businesses and individuals analogizing between what is 
speciªcally permitted in the provision and what they intend to do.92 
The statutory language also treats some “ethically justiªable, or even 
desirable” payments as clearly illegal or fails to properly identify the 
payment.93 To illustrate this proposition, it is possible to imagine a 
government ofªcial, during the course of a civil war where a govern-
ment was blocking food deliveries, agreeing to allow such deliveries 
for personal kickbacks.94 In this situation, such a bribe would clearly 
be socially desirable but prohibited due to the statutory language.95
 The FCPA’s exception for payments for routine, non-discretionary 
government actions is further troublesome since circumstances often 
arise where it is not clear what constitutes a non-discretionary, facilitat-
ing payment.96 For example, suppose a foreign government ofªcial of-
fered to expedite the processing of a company’s lawfully-owed Value-
Added Tax refunds in exchange for a percentage of each refund.97 The 
                                                                                                                      
88 See id. (illustrating three different interpretations of “routine,” and analyzing the 
results under the statute). 
89 Salbu, supra note 14, at 266. 
90 See Salbu, supra note 49, at 451. It should be noted that if a U.S. citizen or business is 
contemplating conduct that raises issues of legality under the anti-bribery provisions, the 
FCPA permits the citizen or entity to request an opinion from the DOJ as to whether the 
conduct would be lawful under the DOJ’s present enforcement policies. Corr & Lawler, 
supra note 17, at 1264. The DOJ is required to make a decision within thirty days of receiv-
ing the request. Id. If the DOJ states that the prospective conduct would not constitute a 
violation of the anti-bribery provisions, that creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
conduct is lawful. Id. 
91 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A) (2000). 
92 Salbu, supra note 49, at 452. 
93 See id. at 451. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See Zarin supra note 50, at 5–3. 
97 Id. 
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company intended the payment to the ofªcial only to expedite the 
processing of the company’s lawful claim to what the government owed 
it.98 Although the payment facially appears to satisfy the requirements 
of the grease payment provision, a DOJ ofªcial declared that the DOJ 
likely would not consider this payment to be a grease payment.99 The 
DOJ ofªcial reasoned that the foreign government ofªcial was exercis-
ing discretion in this situation when determining whose refunds to 
process ªrst.100 To some extent, such discretionary action is inherent in 
expediting the processing of any government papers.101 The exception 
for grease payments thus leaves U.S. businesses to grapple with determin-
ing what constitutes a payment for discretionary government actions.102
 In addition to deciphering the discretionary government action 
puzzle, U.S. businesses also must successfully deduce what constitutes 
a payment to “obtain” or “retain” business.103 The difªculties associ-
ated with distinguishing between grease payments and payments 
made to obtain or retain business pose serious enforcement prob-
lems, as well as substantial problems for U.S. businesses attempting to 
conduct business abroad.104 In United States v. Kay, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the FCPA failed to 
sufªciently illustrate when a payment to a foreign ofªcial was in fact a 
payment intended to obtain or retain business.105 In United States v. 
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. at 5–4. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Zarin, supra note 50, at 5–3. 
102 See id. at 5–3 to 5–4 (providing an example of a facially legal payment but declared 
as one that would “attract the [DOJ’s] attention” and likely be deemed unlawful). 
103 See Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A Com-
parison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 243, 271 (1998). 
104 See id (indicating the need for uniformity in interpreting the FCPA). The DOJ 
ofªcial at the FCPA conference concluded that the payment to the government ofªcial to 
expedite the processing of the business’s refund would violate the FPCA since it involved a 
payment to a foreign ofªcial for the retention of business. Zarin, supra note 50, at 5–3 to –
4. 
105 See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 744–45 (5th Cir. 2004). In 2001, a grand jury 
indicted two American Rice, Inc. executives for bribing Haitian ofªcials to accept false bills 
of lading, which ultimately decreased the import duties owed. Russell Gold, U.S. Court 
Ruling Bolsters Statute Against Bribery, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 2004, available at http://online. 
wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB107627922252323843,00.html. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit held that bribes paid to foreign tax ofªcials to secure illegally reduced 
customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall within the coverage of 
the FCPA. Kay, 359 F.3d at 756. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned from the 
FCPA’s legislative history to determine that Congress intended for the FCPA to apply 
broadly to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining 
or retaining business for some person. Id. at 755–56. 
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Vitusa Corporation, the DOJ prosecuted the Vitusa Corporation for 
FCPA violations resulting from payments or promises of payments of 
approximately $50,000 to a foreign ofªcial to secure payment of a 
debt owed by the government of the Dominican Republic.106 Even 
though the debt was undisputed and the money was intended to ex-
pedite and secure payment, the DOJ treated the payment as an unlaw-
ful payment to induce an ofªcial to use his inºuence to obtain or re-
tain business.107
2. A Grease Payment is Still a Bribe 
 Whether a payment to a government ofªcial is to expedite a rou-
tine government action or to obtain a contract for construction of a 
hospital, the payment constitutes a bribe with several potential delete-
rious effects.108 Even small grease payments can have signiªcant im-
pacts.109 For example, modest bribes paid to building inspectors may 
result in tragedy if an inspector approves a building despite code vio-
lations.110 Under some circumstances, a small payment to a public 
ofªcial to expedite a routine government action is as corrosive and 
morally deªcient as a large payment to a public ofªcial to obtain or 
continue business.111 According to the “broken windows hypothesis,” 
legislation ought to target grease payments as aggressively as higher-
level corruption due to its potentially infectious nature.112 This theory 
suggests that the ability of lower-level ofªcials to accept bribes en-
courages higher-level ofªcials to take bribes of a more substantial 
amount and with greater detriment to the public.113 Additionally, cor-
                                                                                                                      
106 Zarin, supra note 50, at 5–4. The government of the Dominican Republic failed to 
pay its bill in full to Vitusa Corporation for deliveries of powdered milk. Corr & Lawler, 
supra note 17, at 1278. When the Dominican Republic government submitted a payment 
on the milk contract, Vitusa arranged for a portion of these funds to be channeled to the 
Dominican government ofªcial. Id. 
107 Zarin, supra note 50, at 5–4. “The collection of money is part of obtaining or re-
taining business, and a payment in furtherance of that goal is not a facilitating payment.” 
Id. at 5–5. However, it has been argued that the Vitusa Corporation payment was not a 
payment in furtherance of obtaining or retaining business, and thus, the Justice Depart-
ment ought to have treated it as a facilitation payment. Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC 
and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton 
Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 303, 316 (1998). 
108 See Dunfee & Hess, supra note 5, at 477. 
109 See Salbu, supra note 30, at 664. 
110 See id. 
111 See Dunfee & Hess, supra note 5, at 477 (explaining the negative effects of grease 
payments as set forth in the Broken Windows hypothesis) 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
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ruption may spread to higher levels of government as the bribe-
accepting lower-level ofªcials ascend within the heirarchy of govern-
ment positions.114
3. The International Community’s Tolerance for Grease Payments Is 
Fading 
 The FCPA’s treatment of facilitating payments as lawful is inconsis-
tent with the local laws of many foreign countries and international 
conventions that have come into effect since the FCPA’s enactment.115 
The local laws of most foreign countries treat these facilitating pay-
ments as illegal.116 Congress originally excluded such payments from 
the FCPA’s prohibitions in recognition that such payments were com-
mon and even legal in many countries.117 Such payments may still be 
common, but they are no longer legal in many countries.118 The FCPA 
in effect allows U.S. businesses to make payments to government 
ofªcials that may violate the laws of the recipient country, thereby con-
tributing to low-level corruption.119 The FCPA’s exception for facilitat-
ing payments brought much international criticism of the FCPA during 
the implementation of the OECD Convention.120 This criticism evi-
dently was taken to heart as there is no exception for grease payments 
in the OECD Convention.121 The Commentaries on The OECD Con-
vention (OECD Commentaries), however, provide that “small facilita-
tion payments” do not constitute payments made to “obtain or retain 
business or other improper advantage” and are consequently not an 
offense.122 The Commentaries further add that “criminalization by 
                                                                                                                      
114 Id. 
115 See Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 
92 Am. J. Int’l L. 491, 493–94 (1998) (providing an example of an international conven-
tion that does not allow for grease payments); Zarin, supra note 50, at 5–5 (suggesting that 
the FCPA’s allowance for grease payments is inconsistent with the local laws of many na-
tions). 
116 Zarin, supra note 50, at 5–5. 
117 I1 Roger M. Witten, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
§ 2.09, at 2–11 (1997). 
118 See Zarin, supra note 50, at 5–5 
119 Low et al., supra note 103, at 269. 
120 Homer E. Moyer Jr. et al., The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Its Origins, Develop-
ment, Implementation, and Issues to Watch, 2002 A.B.A. Center for Continuing Legal Edu-
cation, National Institute, Sec. Int’l L. & Prac. § III(3)(C)(4). 
121 Witten, supra note 117, § 2.09, at 2–12 n.76. 
122 OECD Convention, supra note 65, comment., art. 1, para. 9. 
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other countries does not seem a practical or effective complementary 
action.”123
 In contrast to both the FCPA and the OECD Commentaries, the 
Inter-American Convention does not create an exception for facilitating 
payments to government ofªcials.124 Article VIII of the Inter-American 
Convention criminalizes all payments made “in connection with any 
economic or commercial transaction, including facilitating pay-
ments.”125 Additionally, the United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion criminalizes the “direct or indirect promising, offering or giving, of 
an undue advantage to the ofªcial such that he will act or refrain from 
acting in the exercise of his ofªcial duties.”126 A literal interpretation of 
this language would include the criminalization of facilitating payments 
to government ofªcials.127 It is plausible that the international commu-
nity has expressed a consensus that facilitating payments constitute 
bribery, and thus, the FCPA places the United States in opposition to 
norms expressed by the international community.128
IV. Analysis 
A. Repeal of the FCPA’s Exception for Grease Payments 
 Repeal of the FCPA’s exception for grease payments quickly re-
solves the deªciencies in the statutory language, the potential adverse 
consequences of such payments, and aligns the United States with the 
international norms concerning bribery as expressed by the interna-
tional community.129 Repeal of the grease payment exception is also 
appropriate considering the erosion of the foundation underlying 
Congress’ original decision to permit grease payments.130 When draft-
                                                                                                                      
123 Id. 
124 Nash, supra note 115, at 493. 
125 Id. (quoting the Inter-American Convention, June 27, 1996, art. VIII, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 105–39. 
126 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 11, 2003, art. 15(a), 43 I.L.M. 
37, 46. 
127 See id. 
128 See McCary, supra note 8, at 314. 
129 See Salbu, supra note 14, at 266 (explaining several deªciencies with the statutory 
language that make the grease payment provision unclear); McCary, supra note 8, at 314 
(noting that that an international consensus has emerged that grease payments are brib-
ery); Wallace-Bruce, supra note 7, at 350 (explaining that the international community is 
progressing toward the elimination of corruption). 
130 See Foreign Trade Hearings, supra note 8, at 217 (stating that it was customary practice 
to give grease payments to underpaid, low-ranking civil servants); H.R. Rep. No. 95–640, at 
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ing the legislation that would lead to the FCPA, Congress propounded 
several reasons for its ambivalence toward grease payments.131 First, in 
sharp contrast to the United States, numerous countries treated 
grease payments as socially permissible.132 Second, a unilateral at-
tempt by the United States to eradicate all such payments was not 
considered to be feasible, and U.S. businesses would be crippled by a 
competitve disadvantage abroad if such payments were prohibited.133 
Finally, it was reasoned that many civil servants in developing coun-
tries earned inadequate wages and customary practice required U.S. 
businesses to provide them with gratuities.134 Even if these reasons 
were still valid, however, Congress’ decision to allow grease payments 
would be subject to criticism because corruption’s negative impact 
outweighs any positive effect it might have.135
 As the international community progresses toward the criminaliza-
tion of all payments to foreign ofªcials, Congress can no longer ground 
its treatment of grease payments in the assertion that foreign countries 
perceive such payments as culturally acceptable.136 The criminalization 
of facilitating payments abroad prompted international criticism of the 
FCPA during the OECD Convention implementation process.137 By 
continuing to permit grease payments, Congress may be sanctioning 
the continued violation of local anti-corruption laws of foreign coun-
tries and the emerging international conventions that criminalize 
grease payments.138 Moreover, given the emerging norms of the inter-
national community, the United States would no longer have to police 
                                                                                                                      
8 (stating that it would not be feasible for the United States to attempt to eradicate grease 
payments unilaterally). 
131 See Foreign Trade Hearings, supra note 8, at 217; H.R. rep. No. 95–640, supra note 8, 
at 8. 
132 Witten, supra note 117, § 2.09, at 2-11. 
133 See Foreign Trade Hearings, supra note 8, at 217. 
134 Id. 
135 See Wallace-Bruce, supra note 7, at 352, 357–59 (explaining that corruption’s nega-
tive consequences outweigh any positive effects it might have). 
136 See McCary, supra note 8, at 314; Wallace-Bruce, supra note 7, at 350, 352 (showing 
that an international effort to extinguish corruption has emerged and that law enforce-
ment, rather than culture, is to blame for the non-enforcement of anti-corruption laws). 
137 See Moyer, supra note 120, § III(C)(4). 
138 See Heifetz, supra note 13, at 210 (stating that the rise of domestic anti-bribery laws 
demonstrates international intolerance of bribery of foreign government ofªcials); Nash, 
supra note 115, at 493 (stating that the FCPA appears noncompliant with Article VIII of the 
Inter-American Convention). 
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grease payments unilaterally if Congress decided to criminalize such 
payments.139
 Instead of the intended altruistic effect contemplated by Con-
gress, grease payments can also adversely affect the host country.140 
Grease payments can interfere with the proper administration of gov-
ernment and result in social unrest.141 In an effort to pocket more 
grease payments, government ofªcials, who issue licenses or permits, 
may deliberately delay operations.142 Furthermore, grease payments 
can create a perception that governments select only certain indi-
viduals for those strategic jobs that provide opportunities to accept 
bribes, leading to feelings of inequity, resentment, and potentially a 
national uprising.143
B. Amendment of the Statute to Include a Monetary Threshold 
 Although elimination of the grease payments exception would 
ameliorate its deleterious effects, Congress and U.S. businesses will 
surely resist, asserting: (1) such a ban imposes enforcement 
difªculties; and (2) prosecution for small grease payments is undesir-
able.144 The opposition will likely further contend that legislation tar-
geting petty facilitation payments is ineffective and subject to charges 
of moral imperialism.145 If such resistance impedes Congressional re-
peal of the exception for grease payments, an alternate solution still 
                                                                                                                      
139 See Wallace-Bruce, supra note 7, at 350 (noting that an international consensus 
against corruption is emerging). 
140 See id. at 357–59 (setting forth six reasons why grease payments are more harmful 
then helpful). 
141 See id. at 358. 
142 Id. 
143 See id. at 358–59. 
144 See Salbu, supra note 14, at 266 (explaining several deªciencies with the statutory 
language that make the grease payment provision unclear); Salbu, supra note 30, at 688 
(stating that prosecution for petty bribery is undesirable); McCary, supra note 8, at 314 
(noting that that an international consensus has emerged that grease payments are brib-
ery); Wallace-Bruce, supra note 7, at 371 (stating that payment for routine government 
actions is entrenched in many developing countries and a business can be harmed by re-
fusing to make a grease payment). 
145 See Salbu, supra note 30, at 688. The risk of moral imperialism is greater with petty 
bribery than grand bribery because it is less controversial to treat a large payment, for 
example a $9.9 million kickback, as corrupt, than a small payment of a few hundred dol-
lars. See id. at 682–83. Grand bribery is less likely to serve any of the potentially legitimate 
social functions that justify smaller payments. Id. 
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exists to rein in the difªculties and abuses associated with grease pay-
ments: a dollar limit or ceiling on permissible payments.146
 Although Congress intended to permit small payments for rou-
tine government actions, the FCPA fails to provide any monetary ceil-
ing on permissible payments.147 Qualifying payments permitted under 
the grease payments exception, in theory, ought to constitute “mod-
est” sums of money to low-ranking ofªcials.148 In practice, the absence 
of a monetary limit has resulted in bribes ranging from a few dollars 
to customs ofªcials to bribes as large as tens of thousands of dollars.149 
The potential for negative effects increases with the size of the illicit 
payment.150 The incidence rate of economic, political, and social 
harm is higher with a bribe of thousands of dollars than with a smaller 
bribe of a few hundred dollars.151
 The ampliªed risks associated with larger bribes suggest the need 
for Congressional amendment of the FCPA to limit the dollar amount 
of grease payments.152 The FCPA’s legislative history reveals both 
comments by Congressmen and witness testimony advocating for the 
inclusion of a dollar limit for permissible grease payments.153 For ex-
ample, Wallace Timmeny testiªed before various House Congres-
sional subcommittees that the FCPA should contain a monetary limit 
on grease payments.154 Additionally, Congressman Krueger of the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated that a 
lawful grease payment should not exceed a set percentage of the re-
                                                                                                                      
146 See Business Accounting Hearings, supra note 9, at 438 (suggesting a better approach 
to grease payments would be to establish a dollar limit). 
147 See Cruver, supra note 2, at 20 (stating that Congress did not want to prohibit small 
payments under the FCPA); Witten, supra note 117, § 2.09, at 2-12 (noting that the FCPA 
has no per se limit on the size of the grease payment). 
148 See Zarin, supra note 50, at 5–1. 
149 Timothy Ashby, Steering Clear of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 Orange County 
Law. 10, 11 (2003). 
150 Salbu, supra note 30, at 663. 
151 Id at 663–64. 
152 See Business Accounting Hearings, supra note 9, at 438 (suggesting a better approach 
to grease payments would be to establish a dollar limit); Unlawful Corporate Payment Hear-
ings, supra note 10, at 43 (suggesting that grease payments should be illegal if over a set 
amount); Salbu, supra note 30, at 663–64 (stating that larger bribes have a greater likeli-
hood of causing economic, political, and social harm). 
153 See Business Accounting Hearings, supra note 9, at 442–43 (suggesting that a permissi-
ble grease payment would fall beneath a certain monetary threshold and in fact be a pay-
ment to expedite the movement of goods or personnel); Unlawful Corporate Payment Hear-
ings, supra note 10, at 44 (suggesting that grease payments should be limited to a set 
percentage of the recipient country’s per capita income). 
154 See Business Accounting Hearings, supra note 9, at 442–43. 
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cipient country’s per capita income.155 He reasoned that basing the 
grease payment threshold upon the host country’s per capita income 
would create an equitable or uniform approach to grease pay-
ments.156
 The FCPA’s legislative history further suggests that the inclusion 
of a dollar limit for grease payments never materialized largely be-
cause Congress did not want to set a minimum price for conducting 
business abroad and felt that the legality of a grease payment should 
focus upon the payment’s nature and purpose.157 During pre-FCPA 
hearings, Congressman Krueger suggested limiting grease payments 
to some percentage of per capita income in the recipient country, or 
$8,700, because “when a Congressman earns more than that in private 
income it is illegal, but if he earns less, it is legal.”158 Congressman 
Eckhardt rejected this idea, insisting that the focus of any legislation 
must be on what constitutes a legal grease payment versus a payment 
to corruptly inºuence a foreign ofªcial.159 Eckhardt added, “I am a 
little bit skeptical about trying to draw minimum amounts because I 
can conceive of situations which involve $100 that would be clearly 
corrupt, whereas a situation which may involve as much as $500 may 
not be.”160 Prior to the 1988 amendments, a witness before the Sub-
committee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs also suggested a minimum threshold 
for a bribe to be considered something other than a grease payment 
at the amount of $5,000.161 Subsequently, Congressman Berman solic-
ited reactions to this idea.162 Another witness testiªed that the focus 
must be on the purpose of the payment and that the insertion of a 
dollar cap would set a minimum price for conducting business 
abroad.163 During another subcommittee hearing, a witness also sug-
gested establishing a dollar limit on grease payments in addition to 
the requirement that the payment be for a routine government ac-
                                                                                                                      
155 See Unlawful Corporate Payment Hearings, supra note 10, at 44. 
156 See id. (indicating that tagging grease payments to per capita income would create 
cost equity). 
157 See Foreign Trade Hearings, supra note 8, at 285 (suggesting that providing a dollar 
limit for grease payments would create a ºoor cost for conducting business abroad); Busi-
ness Accounting Hearings, supra note 9, at 438 (indicating that what constitutes acceptable 
grease payments should focus on the nature of the payment). 
158 Unlawful Corporate Payments, supra note 10, at 43, 44. 
159 See id. at 52. 
160 Id. 
161 Foreign Trade Hearings, supra note 8, at 227. 
162 Id. at 285. 
163 Id.. 
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tion.164 In response, practitioner witnesses William A. Dobrovir and 
Theodore Sorenson indicated that the focus ought to remain on the 
purpose of the payment, rather than a minimal amount.165
 The inclusion of a dollar limit for grease payments does not 
conºict with the concerns expressed by Congress about creating a ºoor 
cost for conducting business abroad when it is part of the following two-
prong test.166 Under this proposed analysis, the FCPA would still re-
quire that the nature or purpose of the payment be to expedite or se-
cure a routine government action.167 The test described, however, 
would additionally require that the payment fall beneath a set percent-
age of the country’s per capita income.168 The continued focus on the 
nature or purpose of the payment ensures that, even if a payment falls 
within the monetary limit, it will not be permissible unless it is actually 
a payment to secure or expedite a routine government action.169
C. The Role of the DOJ 
 The DOJ also has an essential role in clarifying and preventing the 
abuse of the FCPA.170 A U.S. business confronted with a proposed 
transaction involving questionable grease payments can turn to the 
DOJ for assistance.171 To elucidate its enforcement priorities with re-
spect to the FCPA’s bribery provisions, the DOJ released a statement in 
November 1979 that identiªed factors likely to increase prosecution 
and investigation, including the size of the payment, the size of the 
transaction, and the past conduct of the involved persons.172 Although 
the size of the payment or transaction is an escalating factor, the state-
ment fails to provide any further clariªcation to facilitate decision-
making by U.S. businesses.173 If a business still requires further guid-
ance, it can request an opinion procedure from the DOJ that provides a 
                                                                                                                      
164 Business Accounting Hearings, supra note 9, at 442–43. 
165 Id. at 443. 
166 See id. at 442–43 (stating that grease payments should include a dollar amount, and 
must also clearly be payments to expedite the movement of goods or personnel). 
167 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1(b). 
168 See Unlawful Corporate Payments Hearings, supra note 10, at 44. 
169 See Business Accounting Hearings, supra note 9, at 442–43 . 
170 See Longobardi, supra note 11, at 462 (suggesting that the DOJ acknowledged its 
role in providing guidance to the application of the FCPA’s provisions by issuing guide-
lines). 
171 See Cruver, supra note 2, at 62. 
172 Id. at 61. 
173 See generally id. (providing a limited list of factors that increase the likelihood of 
DOJ investigation or prosecution). 
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statement of whether the business’s proposed transaction violates the 
FCPA and whether the DOJ would bring any enforcement action.174 In 
fact, if a posed transaction does not ªt within one of the prescribed 
categories for routine governmental action, an opinion procedure 
should be sought.175 However, due to ambiguities in the review proce-
dure and drawbacks associated with its use, businesses infrequently rely 
upon this source.176 The insufªcient assistance provided by these two 
avenues, and the scarcity of enforcement actions against violators of the 
FCPA, adds to the darkness in which businesses must function.177
 Given the problems associated with the review procedure and the 
scant body of available case law, the DOJ’s promulgation of guidelines 
could provide U.S. businesses with a useful deªnition of what consti-
tutes a grease payment.178 During the wave of opposition and pro-
posed amendments that followed enactment of the FCPA, the DOJ 
expressed a steadfast unwillingness to issue FCPA guidelines.179 The 
DOJ asserted that guidelines would be impractical and unduly bur-
densome for the DOJ with little or no beneªt to U.S. businesses.180 
The DOJ contended that it could not issue guidelines that would en-
able U.S. businesses to tailor their transactions to accord with the 
FCPA.181 Speciªcally, the DOJ contended that illustration of only a few 
hypothetical transactions as legally permissible would result in busi-
nesses restricting operations to bring them within the conªnes of the 
given examples.182 On the other hand, if the DOJ attempted to list 
every possible business permutation companies may employ, busi-
nesses would be forced to hunt through the voluminous list in search 
of a fact pattern similar to its intended transaction.183 Either approach 
                                                                                                                      
174 Id. at 62. To request a review of a proposed transaction, a party must provide de-
tailed information relevant and material to the proposed conduct, as well as any other 
information that the DOJ requires. Longobardi, supra note 11, at 462. 
175 See Cruver, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
176 Id. at 62. 
177 See Longobardi, supra note 11, at 470 (explaining that the DOJ has conducted only 
eighteen reviews of proposed business transactions and all were positive). 
178 See Cruver, supra note 2, at 61–62 (discussing problems with the review proce-
dures); Longobardi, supra note 11, at 473–74 (noting that a widespread belief existed that 
the ambiguities in the FCPA necessitated DOJ guidelines); Perkel, supra note 2, at 697 
(stating that no court has interpreted the grease payment provisions); Salbu, supra note 
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payment provision unclear). 
179 Longobardi, supra note 11, at 474. 
180 See id. at 474–75. 
181 See id. at 475 
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would restrict business dealings and potentially disadvantage U.S. 
businesses in foreign markets.184
 In light of the troubles associated with providing hypothetical 
business transactions, the DOJ could simply issue guidelines that indi-
cate what constitutes a grease payment.185 A possible set of guidelines 
could mandate that “the payor’s purpose must be to secure or expe-
dite a routine government action and the payment cannot exceed a 
speciªc dollar threshold based upon a percentage of the recipient 
country’s per capita income.”186
D. The Role of Business in the United States Beyond Proªt-making 
 The effect of any actions by Congress or the DOJ in attacking brib-
ery will be diminished without the active and responsible participation 
of corporations.187 Firms may seek to provide their employees with 
clear guidance on what constitutes a permissible grease payment 
through their codes of conduct.188 One business code provides: 
“‘[E]ven though such payments may possibly be expected in accor-
dance with area customs and legal interpretations, and would confer no 
improper business advantage on the company, every effort should be 
made to avoid them.’”189
E. Extra-legal Solutions to Weed out the Roots of Corruption 
 Vigorous enforcement of a revised and ideally lucid FCPA may 
still, however, be ineffectual in cracking down on illegal bribes to for-
eign ofªcials.190 States can attack transnational corruption with both 
legislation and institutional change.191 Legislative solutions, such as 
the FCPA, seek to control undesirable behavior primarily by imposing 
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criminal ªnes or other penalties.192 Such legislative endeavors, how-
ever, may inadequately address corruption as long as corruption is 
rooted in political, social, or economic institutions such as patronage, 
low government wages, poverty, and poor economic conditions.193 
Eradication of corruption may continue to evade legislative solutions 
because such solutions dictate conduct rather than attempting to re-
solve the underlying causes of corruption.194 Thus, institutional re-
form may be more successful in combatting corruption than the legis-
lative process.195
 By attacking corruption at its roots, institutional reform may be a 
more effective method to weed out corruption.196 To illustrate, if pov-
erty fosters an environment conducive to corruption, then a war 
against poverty would also be a war against corruption.197 Nations can 
encounter signiªcant challenges, however, when attempting institu-
tional change due to the cyclical nature of some causes of corrup-
tion.198 For example, corruption often funnels a nation’s resources 
away from its people and into the wallets of the corrupt elite, thereby 
exacerbating poverty.199 Thus, institutionalized corruption creates a 
vicious cycle where poverty causes bribery, which exacerbates existing 
structural problems that result in increased poverty, which, in turn, 
leads to more bribery.200 To break the cycle and reduce corruption, 
legislative mechanisms should modify these institutions and social 
structures that support or encourage bribery.201
Conclusion 
 To advocate amendment of the FCPA in 1983, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative William Brock indicated that “we have a responsibility to 
paint a bright line for our ªrms to follow so that they know exactly 
what Congress intended that they can and cannot do.”202 Congress 
has failed to paint this bright line with regard to the grease payment 
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exception in the FCPA. Changes in the international community’s 
perception of corruption and grease payments have contributed to 
the erosion of the logical foundation underlying the FCPA’s original 
exception for grease payments. Congress can address the troubles as-
sociated with grease payments by repealing the FCPA’s exception for 
grease payments, or by amending the statute to include a monetary 
limit set through country speciªc per-capita income evaluation for 
permissible grease payments. Transnational corruption will continue 
to thrive unless Congress acts, the DOJ promulgates guidelines, and 
corporations closely monitor and reduce reliance upon grease pay-
ments. Without the accompaniment of institutional reform, however, 
legislative solutions to corruption will only achieve limited success in 
this battle against corruption and its ill effects. 
